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Abstract ‘Moral bioenhancement’ refers to the use of
pharmaceuticals and other direct brain interventions to
enhance ‘moral’ traits such as ‘empathy,’ and alter any
‘morally problematic’ dispositions, such as ‘aggres-
sion.’ This is believed to result in improved moral
responses. In a recent paper, Tom Douglas considers
whether medical interventions of this sort could be
Bprovided as part of the criminal justice system’s re-
sponse to the commission of crime, and for the purposes
of facilitating rehabilitation (Douglas in Journal of
Ethics 18(2): 101–122, 2014).^ He suggests that they
could Bat least in some cases, permissibly be provided
without valid consent (Douglas in Journal of Ethics
18(2): 101–122, 2014)^ as a form of rehabilitative pun-
ishment. He argues for this conclusion by ‘parity of
reasoning,’ starting from the currently accepted practice
of non-consensual incarceration. His argument appears
to be dependent on the successful defence of the follow-
ing two claims: (1) that non-consensual incarceration is
a morally justifiable practice, and (2) that there is no
meaningful distinction between the forcible imposition
of this practice, and the forcible imposition of medical
interventions on prisoners. From both claims, he de-
duces (3): if non-consensual incarceration is morally
justifiable, so is the non-consensual imposition of med-
ical correctives, in some cases. In this paper, I begin by
suggesting that the basic argument behind the Parity
Claim (2) results in a reductio ad absurdum, whereby
any practice that is sufficiently similar to incarceration in
the ways Douglas presents, would also be considered
permissible. This appears to be an unpalatable conclu-
sion, casting doubt on the soundness of a key premise.
Douglas appears to offer no means of deciding which
practices are sufficiently similar to incarceration in terms
of harm and threat to agency, and of the practices that I
will present, which do seem to be, it does not seem that
he could rule them out in any principled way. Next I turn
to dispute claim (1) relating to the purported justifiabil-
ity of incarceration on rehabilitative grounds. If success-
ful, this attack causes a break in reasoning from the
justifiability of incarceration, to the justifiability of med-
ical interventions (2). Medical interventions would then
require an alternative, independent justification, through
outlining the ways in which they are conducive to a
particular aim of punishment, without relying on the
justifiability of incarceration. This argument has not
been provided, and I suggest that attempts to do so
may run into difficulty. I untangle and make explicit
the various assumptions made in Douglas’ conten-
tion that medical interventions Bmight be thought
conducive to rehabilitation in some offenders,^ lo-
cating my critique in the wider debate on the causes
of crime. Finally, I seek to challenge the normative
weight of the Parity Claim (2), arguing that to
show that two practices are comparable in some
sense is not sufficient to show that both are equally
as permissible (3). Other social purposes must be
considered, leading me to suggest that the forcible
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imposition medical correctives falls beyond the ap-
propriate remit of the criminal justice system.
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Preliminaries
It is important to note that Douglas is clear to distance
himself from our current practice of incarceration, which
is criticised for its overcrowded conditions and the high
risks of rape and assault that it imposes upon prisoners.
It is not this actual incarceration that he takes to be
justifiable. Rather, he assumes that it would be justifi-
able to impose a hypothetical minimal incarceration
model, which would be safer, and provide real opportu-
nities for political participation, legal representation and
education. Douglas does not make any attempt to de-
fend, or provide an independent argument for the claim
that such a model of incarceration would be justifiable.
Instead, the motivation for assuming its justifiability is
that such a model would be Bwidely (though not univer-
sally) accepted,^1 and so is worth taking seriously for
the sake of argument.
The Consent Requirement
Douglas focuses on the theoretical question as to wheth-
er it would be permissible to impose medical interven-
tions on prisoners without their valid consent. He is
motivated by the belief that current debates surrounding
the use of medical correctives on prisoners rest on a
mistaken assumption about consent, which he refers to
as the Consent Requirement. Arguments made by op-
ponents of medical interventions in the criminal context
tend to be premised upon this requirement, which holds
that Bmedical correctives can only permissibly be pro-
vided with the valid consent of the offender who will
undergo the intervention.^2 Such an assumption, Doug-
las argues, seems to follow naturally from the parallel,
undisputed claim in medical ethics, that therapeutic
medical interventions should not, except in certain spe-
cial circumstances, be provided to a competent adult
patient without consent.
When opponents of criminal medical interventions
argue that such a practice would be coercive, and so any
consent obtained would be invalid, they are implicitly
invoking the Consent Requirement as a premise in their
argument against its permissibility. This debate has been
particularly played out in regards to the offer of chem-
ical castration to prisoners, in exchange for early release.
This is said to be coercive, as prisoners already lack a
fundamental sense of liberty and ‘ability to choose,’ and
so any such decision to undertake a medical intervention
would not be freely and voluntarily chosen, thus render-
ing their consent invalid. Douglas seeks to sidestep this
critique, laying out an alternative line of response: that
the Consent Requirement may not be as defensible as
such theorists require.
He argues this through the development of what I
will critique as the ‘Parity Claim’, and analogises the use
of medical correctives to the practice of incarceration.
Foundational to the analogy is the claim that:
Bit is widely thought that the state may permissibly
do things to criminal offenders without their con-
sent that it could not permissibly do to others
without (and in some cases even with) consent.
Thus, for example, it would ordinarily be grossly
wrong to incarcerate someone without consent,
but in the context of criminal justice, non-
consensual incarceration is widely thought to be
permissible.^3
Douglas continues that our current practice of non-
consensual incarceration, orminimal incarceration, places
serious constraints on individuals’ freedom of movement
and freedom of association. He argues that of the several
differences one could appeal to between minimal incar-
ceration and medical correctives, in order to justify why
the consent requirement should hold for criminal medical
correctives despite being overridden for incarceration,
none are successful. Crucially, he asks, if the goal of
rehabilitation is sufficiently important to justify the impo-
sition of non-consensual incarceration, how could this
same goal fail to justify the non-consensual imposition
of at least some medical correctives?
The Parity Claim
Douglas argues that the Consent Requirement runs into
difficulty when applied to the use ofmedical correctives,
1 Ibid., p. 105
2 Ibid., p. 104 3 Ibid., p. 105
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as we already routinely disregard the consent of criminal
offenders in incarcerating them. The onus is therefore
placed on opponents to show why medical correctives
require consent, when incarceration does not. Crucial to
this approach being successful is that the permissibility
of minimal incarceration is assumed for the sake of
argument, due to its wide acceptability. However, while
acceptability may provide motivation for the plausibility
of minimal incarceration, this will not do in terms of
grounding its justifiability. Although assuming certain
premises is necessary for the sake of argument in phi-
losophy, it seems problematic to presuppose as morally
contentious a premise as the justifiability incarceration,
particularly when further contentious implications such
as the forcible imposition of medical correctives stem
from its acceptance. In normative theory we are con-
cerned with what we ought to do, and this is quite often
detached from what we do happen to do. It may be
mistaken, therefore, to view the issue of medical correc-
tives through the lens of the Consent Requirement. Per-
haps our practice of non-consensual incarceration should
be critically re-appraised, rather than having its justifi-
ability taken as an Baccepted^ foundational premise.
In order to undertake this appraisal, it is necessary to
explore the reasons for the practice; the aims of punish-
ment that its imposition is allegedly conducive to, and
whether it can be seen as successful in these aims. As
well as this, I consider the arguments put forward by
Douglas that seek to demonstrate the parity by which
medical correctives and incarceration inflict harm and
threaten agency. Although his aim is to show that med-
ical correctives are no more harmful, and no more of a
threat to agency than incarceration, his analysis also
sheds light on the severity of the harms imposed by
incarceration. In light of such harms, his argument
could plausibly lend support to the view that in-
carceration is indeed objectionable, and therefore
may not do the work to show that non-consensual
medical correctives are permissible, but rather, ex-
poses the problematic nature of both.
Whether the Parity Claim can be used with success in
Douglas’ argument, I argue, is dependent on whether it
can be claimed that incarceration is a morally justifiable
practice. This is because the argument that medical
correctives are permissible insofar as they are sufficient-
ly similar to incarceration, first assumes the permissibil-
ity of incarceration. Douglas acknowledges this assump-
tion; Bplausibly, in committing certain crimes, an of-
fender becomes morally liable to the imposition of
minimal incarceration, and for a substantial period. (In
what follows, I will simply assume that this is so.)^4 The
logic of the argument is as follows, therefore:
I. Non-consensual incarceration is a permissible
practice.
II. There are various harms and threats to agency as-
sociated with incarceration.
III. Non-consensual medical correctives would inflict
a comparable level of harm and pose an analogous
agential threat.
IV. When two practices inflict a comparable level of
harm and pose an analogous agential threat, they
are to be judged as equal in terms of their moral
import.
Conclusion
V. non-consensual medical correctives are permissible.
The argument appears to be that, in committing
crimes and becoming Bmorally liable^ to being incar-
cerated, criminals Bmight also become liable to the
imposition of some varieties of medical intervention.^5
It is suggested, therefore, that Ba proponent of the Con-
sent Requirement owes us an explanation as to why
medical interventions are not among the interventions
to which we become liable.^6
Crucial to Douglas’ argument, and to my critique, is
the fourth premise, which I have made explicit. For
Douglas, there is no significant difference, morally
speaking, between incarceration and a corrective injec-
tion. The reductio ad absurdum of this position, how-
ever, is that anything as harmful as incarceration is
similarly permissible. This reductio is a direct conse-
quence of the fourth premise, causing its soundness to
be cast into doubt. It also results from Douglas’ disman-
tling of the Consent Requirement, and he offers us no
principled way of deciding which punishments would
be permissible, on his analysis, given we have already
accepted consent is not required, and that rehabilitation,
widely conceived, is the aim. This, I will argue, could
plausibly force his account to concede that various other
problematic practices, that he would not have wanted to
include in his initial claim, are similarly permissible.
4 Ibid.,
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. (emphasis added)
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Perhaps anticipating an objection like this, Douglas is
quick to point out that Bit should not be assumed that, in
challenging the Consent Requirement, I am defending
the view that more invasive interventions—such as ma-
jor surgical procedures—could permissibly be imposed
without consent.^7 Yet, he provides no argument as to
why certain other interventions would not be permissi-
ble, given the implications of his argument. Although he
is clearly not arguing for this conclusion, he is challeng-
ing the Consent Requirement, and if successful, he
would need to explain why other forms of punishment
of the same intensity and level of invasiveness, which
also aimed at Bwhatever higher goal rehabilitation
serves^8 would not be permissible, as long as they were
no more harmful than incarceration. The aim of the
Parity Claim is exactly to show that the similarity be-
tween incarceration and medical correctives in various
respects provides a challenge to the Consent Require-
ment; if it does not hold for one, why should it hold for
another? This has important implications.
Rather than using a misleadingly extreme example
likemajor surgical procedures, as Douglas does, in order
to assure the reader that he could not be advocating for
such a conclusion, let us instead consider a practice that
would be sufficiently comparable to incarceration in
terms of harm and threat to agency. Suppose that a
new type of punishment was invented. Here, punish-
ment is simulated as lasting longer, and a criminal’s own
crime is simulated as being committed against them, in
order to induce empathetic responses, which are said to
facilitate rehabilitation. If it could be shown that any
harm or distress caused by this was comparable to, and
no worse than, the harms already inflicted by incarcer-
ation, then it seems that this would also be permissible
on Douglas’ analysis. Further, it is not clear why this
would be more threatening to agency than keeping
someone under lock and key. This practice may even
be more ‘efficient’ at rehabilitation, enabling the offend-
er to be released sooner, and so could actually enhance
their agency. Indeed, it is a struggle to think of anything
that would be a greater threat to agency than the ultimate
loss of liberty that incarceration entails, given that
Douglas acknowledges the way in which incarceration
can directly interfere with the mind.9 This is a potential
problem for Douglas, as it means there are innumerable
practices comparable to incarceration in this way, which
could be levelled as instances of a reductio. The bar for
comparisons of harm and threat to agency is therefore
set very high, if incarceration is the benchmark.
Similarly, let us imagine a medical corrective is
invented that regulates a released criminal’s sleeping
patterns, causing them to sleep for 12 hours of the day.
Consider it a medically-induced curfew. This is imple-
mented with the view to reducing their involvement in
the night-time economy, which for them, previously
involved drugs, gangs, and violence. With the help of
this drug, the criminal will now arise, like clockwork, at
6am, and experience 12 hours of the day, until around
5pm when they will start getting tired and prepare
themselves for sleep, and eventually fall fast asleep at
6pm. This ensures they can no longer be led astray by
the night-time culture that they once used to occupy. It
seems that this would be a no greater threat to their
agency than the practice of minimal incarceration,
which already placed serious constraints on their free-
dom of movement. Indeed, they have greater liberty
through this practice, as they are able to live in the
outside world. In many ways, their agency would be
greater enhanced through such a programme – the guar-
antee that they would be asleep by 6pm would enable
them tomake the most of their day, and the effectiveness
of the procedure means they would not reoffend, and so
would maintain their basic freedom by avoiding incar-
ceration again. There is no reason to think this practice
would be any more harmful than minimal incarceration,
which already subjects prisoners to great harms regard-
ing free movement and association, and in many ways,
would perhaps even be less harmful, given they are
removed from a potentially noxious prison environ-
ment. It seems that this is a practice that we would not
be comfortable with implementing coercively however.
Yet it fulfils the conditions of parity with incarceration,
and would be thought of as ‘conducive to rehabilitation’
on Douglas’ analysis.
The position seems to be, therefore, that as we are
permitted to harm criminals through incarceration, and
if this is comparable to some other practice, then we are
also allowed to harm criminals via this other practice,
with the overarching reason being that their consent is
already considered violable in the context of criminal
justice. Yet this reductio makes the Parity argument
appear unpalatable. It seems that the decision to deem
a particular punishment permissible, is balanced against
other considerations, not just its similarity with
7 Ibid., p. 104
8 Ibid., p. 106
9 Ibid., p. 117
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incarceration. I will return to this argument later. Doug-
las is clear to point out that his intention is only to
propose that medical correctives might be justifiable,
and that his argument Bdoes not of itself establish as
much,^10 as Bthere might be other moral reasons to
prefer an approach in which medical correctives are
offered as an optional alternative,^11 rather than being
compulsory. But my argument is only to point out that it
is not even clear that they might be justifiable on this
reasoning, given the flaw in the soundness of this key
reductio-inducing argument.
Further, in arguing that a parallel Consent Require-
ment does not hold for criminals, they are problematical-
ly differentiated as a class of people, to whom the Con-
sent Requirement does not apply, categorically speaking.
The reason that we incarcerate criminals, however, is not
because we think it permissible to do anything to them
without their consent, or because the Consent Require-
ment simply no longer holds for them in light of their
offending. Rather, it is because of the particular aim of
punishment that incarceration is intended to serve, be that
rehabilitative, retributive or deterrent. This aim, whatever
it may be, is what grounds the justifiability of incarcer-
ation. Consider; prisoners on America’s death row are
not murdered because, or, for the reason that, their
consent is violable. Rather, it is because of the intended
retributive and deterrent effects (as unfounded as they
may be) that this punishment is purportedly justified.
That prisoners’ consent is violated in the process, is a
corollary, or parallel effect, of the primary aims and
justifications of the punishment. It is not the case that
they become liable to punishment because of the viola-
bility of the Consent Requirement. Therefore, it does not
seem enough to argue that the violability of their consent
is what grounds another form of punishment.
It may be objected that it is surely a necessary com-
ponent of a theory of punishment that the consent of
offenders is violable, for their punishment to be permis-
sibly meted out. This is why it seems justifiable to
incarcerate offenders on rehabilitative grounds, and
why it seems objectionable to incarcerate those who
have not yet offended, but who may pose an equal risk
of offending (given certain presumptions about their
dispositions and background, say) also on rehabilitative
grounds. The answer has to be that the offender has
acted in a way that removes the Consent Requirement
from applying, and therefore permits the forcible impo-
sition of rehabilitative interventions. This may be true,
but, as aforementioned, the fact that an offender’s con-
sent is flouted is seemingly a consequence of the pur-
ported aims of punishment, not the main, motivating
principle to be carried over elsewhere. Rather, the pri-
mary justification for incarceration is the positive argu-
ment for the purpose it is meant to serve, in this case
rehabilitation, and the violability of an offenders’ con-
sent is a consequence of, and is justifiable by, this
purpose. It is not the case that offending leaves any
non-consensual practice permissible – it is justifiable
towards some end. The Consent Requirement no longer
holds because of what we want to achieve in punish-
ment, and it is not the case that violable consent is the
justification for the punishment. Douglas, however, in
focusing on the discrepancy in the application of the
Consent Requirement, and in neglecting to outline the
positive aspect of the argument for incarceration, is
assuming that both incarceration andmedical correctives
can realise their rehabilitative goals, and so are justifi-
able. This is a step that I will turn to interrogate next.
Thus far I have attempted to show that the Parity
argument is susceptible to an unappealing reductio, and
that the violability of the Consent Requirement is only
part of the story. It follows that the positive argument
from rehabilitation for incarceration and medical correc-
tives, is problematically lacking in Douglas’ account.
Incarceration is justifiable with reference to, and from
the standpoint of, a particularly theory of punishment. If
it could be shown that the imposition of medical correc-
tives was also justifiable under the aims and purposes of
this same theory of punishment, then it would seem
more plausible to use the permissibility of incarceration
to justify the permissibility of medical correctives.
Rehabilitation
This appears to be a missing step in Douglas’ argument
– yes, it is widely thought it is permissible to do things to
prisoners without their consent – but why? What is the
purpose of this punishment that we impose non-
consensually?
Douglas’ account assumes that both medical correc-
tives and incarceration are justifiable by, and fulfil re-
habilitative purposes. I suggest that both conceptually
and empirically speaking, incarceration may not be able
to deliver rehabilitation. Further, at the very least, I
assert that it should not be safely assumed that it does,
10 Ibid., p. 120
11 Ibid.
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as Douglas’ argument demands. He briefly considers the
objection that medical correctives and incarceration
have different aims of punishment, and so cannot em-
ploy the same justification:
BMedical correctives are, we are assuming, employed
in order to aid the offender’s rehabilitation. By contrast,
incarceration, it might be argued, is intended to mete out
deserved suffering, to communicate social disapproval,
or to deter third parties from offending. Thus, one might
argue that consent is required for medical correctives,
but not for minimal incarceration, on the grounds that
the goals of incarceration are different to, and perhaps
morally more urgent than, the goals served by medical
correctives. Perhaps it is permissible to nonconsensually
treat offenders in intrusive ways in order to realise
retributive, communicative or deterrent goals, but not
in order to realise rehabilitative ones.^.12
He rebuts the critique that prison is justified on other
grounds rather than rehabilitative, in claiming that reha-
bilitation Bhas commonly also been regarded as a goal,
and in some cases, the only goal of incarceration,^13
citing the work of Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de
Beaumont as a classic statement of the view that reha-
bilitation is the sole goal of incarceration. Further,
Douglas argues that two other goals of incarceration,
incapacitation and deterrence, are also Bcommonly
thought to serve the same higher objective as rehabili-
tation: namely, the prevention of crime or, more gener-
ally, themaintenance of security.^14 This seems to prob-
lematically broaden the idea of ‘rehabilitation,’ howev-
er, and leads to the unpalatable conclusion that almost
anything that fulfils these expansive goals can be done
under the banner of rehabilitation, as long as it is not
more harmful than minimal incarceration, leading to the
kind of reductio discussed earlier. I will grant, however,
that rehabilitation, however broadly conceived, is osten-
sibly considered to be the purpose of incarceration, as
opposed to say, retribution. I will now turn to explore
whether incarceration is successful in this purpose, and
so whether it may plausibly be justified this way.
The Problem of Prison
There appears to be potential difficulty in appealing to
rehabilitative aims to justify the practice of incarceration.
Even if we accept Douglas’ broad definition of rehabil-
itation as Bcrime prevention,^ it is questionable as to
whether incarceration is indeed conducive to this aim.
Douglas is correctly quick to point out that our prac-
tice of incarceration as it currently stands is:
Bhard to justify given prevailing prison conditions,
which often involve exposing incarcerated indi-
viduals to overcrowded conditions, a high risk of
rape and assault, and serous health threats.^15
Instead, he asks us to imagine a utopian prison sys-
tem that:
Bplaced serious and constant constraints on free
movement and association, but otherwise exposed
offenders to no greater risks to their health and
secur i ty than average members of the
unincarcerated citizenry, and took all reasonable
steps to safeguard opportunities for political par-
ticipation, legal representation and education.^16
Imagining a tweaked prison system that would be less
damaging to criminals’ physical wellbeing, and with
purportedly improved rehabilitative functions, Douglas
does not broach the question as to whether incarceration
actually is the most effective method of crime preven-
tion. Yet, it seems that the issue remains as to whether a
punishment which still placed such Bserious and con-
stant constraints^ on free movement could properly be
conceived as rehabilitative, as compared with say, a non-
custodial sentence. Under a minimal incarceration mod-
el, offenders would still be exposed to psychological and
other health risks, through constraints on their move-
ment and association, in a way that might impact upon
their rehabilitation. Indeed, it is being assumed that any
risks imposed that are a consequence of these Bserious
and constant^ constraints and curtailments, are permis-
sible and not antithetical to rehabilitation.
Yet it is widely accepted that prison has an adverse
effect on an already vulnerable population’s mental
health. A recent report from the All-Party Parliamentary
Group (APPG) on Prison Health suggested that prisons
continue to be used as institutions for individuals with
mental health problems, and recommended that other
institutions might cater for their needs more effectively.
They cited the Office for National Statistics (ONS)
12 Ibid., p. 106
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. (emphasis added)
15 Ibid., p. 105
16 Ibid.
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survey of mental ill heath in the prison populations in
England and Wales in 1997 which indicated that B90%
of prisoners have at least one mental health disorder,
including personality disorder, psychosis, neurosis, al-
cohol misuse and drug dependence [1].^17 The majority
of that number have ‘common’ mental health problems
such as depression and anxiety, and it was suggested that
much of this is likely to be related to their imprisonment
rather than having been a contributing factor to it, indi-
cating that incarceration has deleterious effects on men-
tal health.
This cuts to the heart of the debate: can prisons,
which unavoidably affect individuals in this way, truly
serve their rehabilitative function? Even the most
idealised prison system, that wasn’t a ‘school for crime,’
had various educational programmes in place, and took
steps to ensure a job on release, would plausibly have an
effect on an individual’s psyche. Nevertheless, if such a
utopian prison system were successful in its aims, it
would seem that this success would be down to more
than the feature of ‘locking people up,’ qua incarcera-
tion. It would be all the other aspects; the vocational
programmes and efforts to reintegrate prisoners back
into society, that fulfil punishment’s rehabilitative aims,
rather than the act of incarceration itself. Indeed, such
initiatives plausibly do much to combat against the
negative psychological and social effects associated
with incarceration. This raises the question as to whether
the custodial part of the sentence – incarceration itself, is
indeed a necessary or morally justifiable practice to im-
pose upon offenders, if the rehabilitative function could
be served through other means. There is reason to sup-
pose that in ideal circumstances, a more just punishment
system would incarcerate only the most dangerous crim-
inals, that are beyond psychological help. One could also
point to the Scandinavian model as evidence that lower
incarceration rates and shorter sentences are more condu-
cive to low recidivism rates [2, 3],18 a pattern that points
to the counterproductive nature of imprisonment, even
the minimal incarceration model that Douglas suggests.
Separate to the social scientific arguments surround-
ing crime prevention, there is a rich debate amongst
philosophers concerning whether punishment is a mor-
ally justifiable practice per se. Douglas’ argument rests
on our acceptance of the assumption that the practice of
minimal incarceration is permissible even in his
imagined situation. As aforementioned, he notes that it
would be Bwidely (though not universally) accepted that
the state could permissibly impose conditions of this
sort…on at least some criminal offenders.^19It is in-
structive to note that he uses the language of ‘accepted’
– such a practice would be accepted, rather than justifi-
able. This is seen as sufficient motivation to ask us to
accept it for the sake of argument. Suffice it to say that
many practices would be, and are, widely accepted,
despite not being morally justifiable. Legal tax avoid-
ance and the death penalty in the USA serve as two such
examples. Yet it seems methodologically problematic to
argue for further, similar practices based on their simi-
larity to an already accepted, but admittedly controver-
sial, practice. That we may justifiably non-consensually
incarcerate criminals is taken as a given by Douglas,
when in fact this is a contentious point of debate. Per-
haps most famously, Ted Honderich has condemned the
practice of incarceration in his book Punishment: The
Supposed Justifications. He argues that of the three main
theories of punishment, deterrence, retribution, and re-
habilitation, none can sufficiently justify the practice
[4].20 Although there is not enough space here to outline
his case, I believe he provides a compelling, and at the
very least, plausible account of why even Douglas’
minimal incarceration model would be unjustifiable.
Though there is little doubt that Douglas’ view would
be widely accepted. Deidre Golash similarly argues that
utilitarian and retributive justifications for punishment
fail, both conceptually and empirically [5],21 while Da-
vid Boonin argues that purported solutions to the prob-
lem of punishment –why it is permissible for the state to
treat those who break the law differently from those who
do not – are unsatisfactory, proposing victim restitution
as an alternative to punishment [6].22 Elizabeth Ander-
son considers mass incarceration to be Bmodern
outlawry,^ removing ordinary protections of citizenship
from already stigmatised groups. Far from deterring
crime, she argues, (and conceivably, from aiding reha-
bilitation, I add), this practice invites the criminal vic-
timization of outlaw groups, undermining the rule of
law, equality under the law, and a democratic culture
[7].23
17 Douglas, “Moral Liability,” p. 105
18 Douglas, “Moral Liability,” p. 114
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 117
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 103
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Increasingly theorists are submitting that our current
practice of punishment is failing in its aims, and there-
fore cannot be justified by those same aims. As well as
this, it is argued that punishment is problematic per se,
not just our current, flawed approach, casting doubt on
the justifiability of Douglas’ alternative minimal incar-
ceration model. Yet, it remains an accepted practice, in
terms of policy. Douglas may be reasoning from the
socially and historically contingent fact that we current-
ly do incarcerate, but this does not mean that we ought
to. It may be problematic to use this practice as a
springboard for justifying further similar practices,
therefore. Although this paper has used the words ‘per-
missibly’ and ‘justifiably’ somewhat interchangeably, I
am concerned primarily with justifiability, as I consider
this prior to permissibility. From the point of view of
ideal theory, therefore, it seems plausible that we would
not want normative, guiding principles to be shaped and
constrained by current dogmas, particularly if there are
reasons to doubt such beliefs.
Incarceration and Harm
Thus far it has been suggested that incarcerationmay not
be justifiable on rehabilitative grounds. It could plausi-
bly be maintained that the reason there is a discrepancy
in Douglas’ imagined interlocutor’s thinking – that the
Consent Requirement does not hold for incarceration,
but does for medical correctives – is because neither are
truly justifiable, and so ideally, neither ought to be non-
consensually imposed. The imagined interlocutor might
maintain that incarceration is indeed harmful, but that a
line must be drawn somewhere, in regards to what
further harms we may permissibly impose upon pris-
oners, even though we already permissibly expose them
to great harms. On such an approach, Douglas’ argu-
ments to show that medical interventions are only as
harmful or problematic as minimal incarceration, could
actually serve as arguments against minimal incarcera-
tion, and as such, are not sufficient in establishing the
permissibility of forced medical correctives. In ac-
knowledging how much harm incarceration already in-
flicts, Douglas’ analysis could lead one to question
whether we should indeed be imposing this practice at
all, if we recognise it as harmful.
Douglas considers the idea that the right to bodily
integrity could be invoked in defence of why the Consent
Requirement holds for medical correctives, but not incar-
ceration, and therefore why the former are thought to be
impermissible. An imagined interlocutor maintains that
the specific rights to bodily integrity that protect against
injection, as in a medical corrective, aremore robust than
the specific rights to free movement and association that
are violated under minimal incarceration. The exponent
of such a view is making the Robustness Claim:
BIt takes more serious criminal offending for the
rights to bodily integrity that protect against injection
to lose their protective force than for the rights to free
movement and association that protect against minimal
incarceration to lose theirs.^
Such an individual holds that the Consent Require-
ment may be flouted for incarceration, therefore, but not
for medical correctives, given the robustness of the right
to bodily integrity. What is the basis for such a claim?
Douglas considers the argument that the right to bodily
integrity is more robust than others because it protects
against forms of treatment that typically cause serious
harm, more serious than constraints on free movement
and association involved in minimal incarceration. He
responds that it is difficult to see how this consideration
could be invoked to defend the Robustness Claim, be-
cause the restrictions on movement and association
entailed by incarceration would also Breliably cause
(and may themselves constitute) significant harms.^24
This is because incarceration and the restrictions it en-
tails Bwould frequently damage existing personal rela-
tionships while making it difficult to form new ones,
they would seriously restrict sexual freedoms, they
would make it impossible to pursue most careers, and
they would more generally prevent the realisation of
many life-plans,^ and at the very least, would Bcause
significant distress.^25 Douglas admits, therefore, that
minimal incarceration is Bseverely harmful,^ in most
cases. But this point is not intended by him to show that
incarceration is morally problematic, but rather, that Bit
is difficult to see why we should expect that the impo-
sition of an injection would normally inflict more
harm.^26 Yet it seems plausible to suggest that exposing
prisoners to this level of harm, as Douglas admits we do,
might hinder their rehabilitation in some way, furthering
the argument that it is unjustifiable on such grounds.
Douglas similarly dismisses the argument that the
robustness claim is to be defended via an appeal to the
protection of agency. He argues there is no reason to
24 Ibid. p. 102
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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think Bthat interfering with someone’s body by injecting
a drug (typically) constitutes a more grave threat to
agency than does constraining his freedom ofmovement
and association in the way entailed by minimal
incarceration.^27 Further, he argues that it is not the case
that interfering with the mind, as would occur with
medical correctives, constitutes a more severe threat to
agency, than merely removing options, as in minimal
incarceration. He suggests that such a viewmight rest on
an assumption that interfering with the mind is more
threatening to agency due to the way in which it inter-
feres with agency at its roots. However, he makes the
insightful point that constraints on free movement can
also interfere with the mind, and so agency at its roots.
This is because the mind is Bdependent on, and influ-
enced by, our immediate natural and social environment,
which in turn is affected by restrictions on free move-
ment and association.^28 On such a view, minimal in-
carceration can also directly influence the mind. These
arguments present non-consensual minimal incarcera-
tion as incredibly invasive and harmful. In another con-
text, they could plausibly be used to provide a strong
case for the reassessment of the practice. They do not
appear to necessarily do the work to show that another
analogously harmful practice should also be permissible,
but rather, shed light on the problematic nature of both.
Medical Correctives and Rehabilitation
In light of this, a proponent of medical correctives might
make the alternative case that, in bypassing much of the
harms associated with incarceration, such correctives
are a more appealing practice. If we could aid prisoner’s
rehabilitation with the use of a brief injection, without
subjecting them to the harms caused by incarceration,
then perhaps this would be preferable. This argument
would require a prior justification for medical correc-
tives on rehabilitative grounds, however, as the purport-
ed justifiability of incarceration is no longer being used
as the grounding. Indeed, correctives are being present-
ed as an alternative, given the problems associated with
incarceration. Can they be justified using a standalone
theory of rehabilitative punishment, therefore?
That medical correctives can in fact aid rehabilitation
is something that Douglas takes as a given, without
argument. Yet the question as to whether medical
correctives are conducive to the aims of the punishment
according to which their implementation is justifiable,
should be explored. How might this justification go,
therefore? Douglas states that research is said to have
uncovered the Bneural correlations of dispositions to-
wards aggression, impulsiveness, diminished empathet-
ic ability and psychopathy.^29 He is implicitly associat-
ing these traits with criminal activity, a connection
which requires further justificatory support. Corre-
spondingly, scientists are also Bsuggesting means of
influencing these dispositions in ways that might be
thought conducive to rehabilitation in some
offenders.^30 Douglas does not opine exactly how alter-
ing such dispositions would constitute rehabilitation or
why altering these traits would yield the desired results,
nor does he outline which sorts of offenders would be
targeted, or for which crimes. Yet these are all key steps
to explaining how medical correctives would fulfil a
rehabilitative function. He provides the examples that
anti-depressants have Bshown promise in reducing
aggression,^31 and that Bdivalproex has been found to
reduce impulsiveness in adolescents with explosive
temper.^32 It appears that the direction of current re-
search leads him to conclude that Bwewill have available
a significant range of medical interventions capable of
aiding rehabilitation.^ However, I believe there are a
number of assumptions in this view that require
unpacking. It is no good to assume for the sake of
argument that such drugs will aid rehabilitation. Whether
such drugs really can facilitate rehabilitation is inextrica-
bly and interdependently tied up with their permissibility.
Indeed, whether such drugs would actually aid rehabili-
tation, and so be permissible, depends on how rehabilita-
tion itself is defined, and what it is theorised to consist in.
The following set of premises appear to be founda-
tional to Douglas’ argument:
(1) there are neural correlates of dispositions towards
aggression, impulsiveness, diminished empathetic
ability and psychopathy
(2) the discovery of these neural correlates allows us to
plausibly identify and alter the dispositions they
correlate with
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 101, emphasis added
31 Ibid., p. 84
32 Ibid.
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(3) such dispositions cause people to commit crimes,
or at the very least, appear to have a significant
impact on whether or not people commit crimes
(4) altering these dispositions can constitute rehabili-
tation in some criminals, as they would no longer
be inclined to commit crime
These premises appear to indicate that criminal ac-
tivity has mental causes that are, to some extent, deter-
mined. Douglas may interject that he is no where
claiming that crime is fully determined by such disposi-
tions, and that his account is consistent with an
interactionist model of crime, that holds that these dis-
positions interact with certain environmental circum-
stances to cause an individual to commit a crime. How-
ever, this is not what his account does state, and given
his approach neglects any such mention of the social
causes of crime, it is worth noting the ways in which a
more holistic social view might present a challenge the
approach he invokes, and render it incomplete. It may
plausibly be suggested that dispositions do not vary that
dramatically between individuals. Dispositions could be
conceived of merely as dispositions, that, until trig-
gered, lay dormant. What does vary more dramatically
between individuals, however, and does affect whether
such dispositions come into play, is the environment,
and the conditions that facilitate their manifestation. The
kind of approach that views the individual as the appro-
priate focus of intervention to control dispositional risk
factors of crime, therefore, fails to address exactly why
some people go on to commit crime, with such disposi-
tions. It is in this sense that the social conditions of crime
are neglected from such a narrative.
This approach also appears to ‘other’ criminals in its
assumption that they are morally bankrupt, or at least,
somewhat different in character from the rest of the
population. The language used in the paper, such as
the intention that the Bpost-rehabilitation offender will
be a morally better person,^ conflates morality with
criminality, and posits criminals as morally deficient,
as a general class, in virtue of their offending. This
cannot be the case, as the supposed immorality of an
action does not seem to be either necessary or sufficient
for its being illegal. For instance, whilst most would
agree that extramarital affairs are morally wrong, they
are not a crime. Conversely, while recreational drug use
is illegal, it is not clear how exactly this behaviour is
‘immoral’ (when the issue of mere use is considered
separately from problems such as drug-related
violence). It may be the case that committing crimes
with disregard for the social consequences does com-
prise flawed behaviour, but it may also be inaccurate and
counterproductive to label criminals in such a divisive
way. It seems equally plausible that criminals deemed
‘immoral’ by the state could exhibit moral traits such as
empathy and have ‘moral motives’ in their own personal
relationships. The language of ‘morality,’ in discussions
on the treatment of offenders, therefore, should be viewed
with caution. The idea of the state prescribing ‘morality’
in this way is reminiscent of the forced use of hormonal
treatments to reduce libido, when homosexuality was
criminalised and considered ‘deviant’ behaviour. Such a
practice is now condemned because we acknowledge that
homosexuality should not have been considered immor-
al, or a crime. While offenders in this case have commit-
ted a crime, the point remains that this does not necessar-
ily indicate a flaw in their morality, and so attempts to
‘treat’ this as such could be misguided. Further, without
further explication as to how certain crimes do indicate a
flaw in an individual’s morality, and how medical correc-
tives would eradicate this flaw, the discussion seems to
problematically presuppose too much.
The idea that criminals as a class are to be distin-
guished in terms of their dispositions towards crime is
reminiscent of the positivist school of criminology of the
late nineteenth century, which attempted to find psycho-
logical and biological bases for criminal behaviour. The
dominance of positivist criminology declined after the
1960s when sociological criminology came into the
fore, which led to a shift towards seeing crime as the
outcome of social circumstances [8]. In particular, the
Chicago School provided a strong challenge to the
individualistic focus in Britain, and, for the first time,
treated the Bcity ,^ or environment, as an issue. This
approach was characterised by relating delinquency
Bto the nature of the social processes associated with
the areas in which it occurred.^ Similarly, the American
sociologist, Robert Merton, located the source of criminal
behaviour in relative deprivation, and considered phe-
nomena such as property crime as structural issues, and
the result of a lack of equality of opportunity. This
cursory discussion of different criminological ap-
proaches is intended to show that there exists a rich
and varied debate regarding the causes of crime that
Douglas fails to acknowledge in assuming that bio-
logical dispositions can have enough bearing to
merit intervention at that level. Positivism operates
under the guise of scientific objectivity, but is itself
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an ideological position, positing the individual as
the ultimate unit of concern, to the neglect of social
determinants. In so far as his argument for medical
correctives implicitly operates on this model, it is
equally liable to the challenges posed to positivism
by competing theories of crime. Rather than taking
positivism as an axiomatic premise, therefore, pro-
ponents of medical correctives ought to make ex-
plicit, and subsequently defend, the use of positiv-
ism in their argument. Even if Douglas maintains
that his argument for medical correctives is intended
to compliment, rather than replace a concentrated
effort in addressing the social determinants of crime,
the connection between crime and the rehabilitative
success of the proposed punishment remains to be
shown. It is not explicitly defended, but rather, is
assumed, which proves problematic if a standalone
case for the rehabilitative purpose of medical cor-
rectives is what is required.
Further, there appears to be no scientific consensus
on the issue as to whether crime can be treated at the
dispositional level. These practical considerations are
important because they may betray a flaw in the under-
standing of the causes of crime, and so risk offering a
mistaken solution. This problem is highlighted in an
examination of the use of chemical castration on
convicted sex offenders. Chemical castration via admin-
istration of the testosterone-lowering drugs has been
found effective in reducing recidivism in sexual of-
fenders with paraphilias in some small-scale, controlled
studies, while others have found no significant effect,
indicating that evidence for effectiveness is not robust
[9]. Even in studies which do appear to show lower
recidivism rates in those who have undertaken surgical
castration, compared with those who have not, John
McMillan warns that we should be cautious about the
quality of the controls. This is because the group who did
not undertake the procedure, and had higher recidivism
rates, had been counselled about the possibility of castra-
tion but had decided against the operation. McMillan
posits that it might be the case that Btheir decision to not
follow through with operation was because of a lack of
resolve to control their offending, whereas men who were
prepared to have this operation might have been more
willing to do whatever it takes to change their behaviour
[10].^ The low recidivism rate, therefore, may have been
attributable to their will and desire to change, as indicated
by their compliance with the procedure, or at the very
least, it remains unclear what their success is a result of.
Assuming these practices work even ‘for the sake of
argument,’ therefore, is to make a rather large assumption
about the causes of crime, an area of perennial debate.
Social Considerations
Suppose a clear link between the imposition of medical
correctives and rehabilitation had been established. This
link was enough to show that they could be justified as a
form of punishment, under this purpose. Is this enough
to show that they may permissibly be imposed, howev-
er? I do not believe it is. Crucially, just because a
punishment can be justified under the aims of a partic-
ularly theory, this does not do enough to show that it is
permissible, or that it ought to be implemented. Douglas
admits that his argument does not do enough to show the
justifiability of medical correctives, merely the possibil-
ity that they are justifiable. I believe it is still worth
noting, however, the problems associated with suggest-
ing it as a possibility, given other considerations.
While crime prevention is the primary purpose of our
criminal justice system, and a given punishment may be
thought conducive to its fulfilment, this purpose does
not exist in a vacuum. It is neither the only, nor neces-
sarily the most important social purpose. There exist
other social purposes that must be taken as balancing
considerations. These include, say, the fulfilment of
justice, particularly relational, the enhancement of dem-
ocratic freedom, and the attainment of social cohesion.
Such purposes may plausibly be undermined by the
further stigmatisation and categorisation of prisoners,
which could occur through the use of medical correc-
tives. Although partly an empirical question, it would
not be unreasonable to suggest that such treatments
could have adverse effects, given the existing
demonisation of, and stigma faced by ex-convicts. Such
parallel social purposes, therefore, could conceivably
serve to qualify and place limits on the goal of crime
prevention, deeming medical correctives impermissible
per se. Even if the Parity Claim were based on more
sound reasoning concerning the justifiability of incar-
ceration and the equal moral import of incarceration and
medical correctives, Douglas would still face a key
hurdle. The requirement that various social purposes
need to be balanced against each other, shows that the
analogy cannot be stretched to an extent that allows us to
conclude that the infliction of a comparable harm is even
‘theoretically’ permissible in this case.
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Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to cast doubt on the
viability of Douglas’ parity approach in reasoning about
the permissibility of non-consensually imposingmedical
correctives on criminals. It has been argued that pris-
oners’ consent being violable in the context of incarcer-
ation is not sufficient reason to ground the imposition of
other punishments non-consensually. Indeed, removing
the requirement for consent in this way leads to an unpal-
atable reductio ad absurdum, whereby any practice just as
harmful as incarceration seems to be permissible. Rather,
the justifiability of a particular punishment is grounded in
its aim towards fulfilling a particular purpose. Therefore,
for the parity of reasoning approach to carry any weight,
and for the structure of the argument to be applicable,
medical correctives and incarceration need to be shown
as aiming towards the same purpose, which, in this case, is
taken to be rehabilitation. It has been suggested, however,
that incarceration may not be justifiable under rehabilita-
tive aims, and therefore may not provide the grounding for
the justifiability of medical correctives, that is required of
it. That incarceration is justifiable according to rehabilita-
tive reasoning is at least plausibly disputable, given both
empirical and conceptual concerns about the practice.
Further, it has been suggested that an independent case
that medical correctives are justifiable according to reha-
bilitative purposes, may also be difficult to make. There
are various assumptions contained within the view that
they can aid rehabilitation, particularly the very basic idea
that they will do so at all, given that rehabilitation is a
perennially debated area of criminology. Finally, even if
the case could be conclusively made that medical correc-
tives were conducive to rehabilitation, it is unlikely that it
could be shown that they may permissibly be imposed.
While crime prevention is a key social purpose of the state,
it seems that other social purposes serve to constrain and
limit the practices which may be imposed under this aim.
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